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The combination of an efficiency wage approach with the explicit
consideration of pricinq and product market conditions leads to
the existence of a unique NAIRU. The value of the NAIRU can be
influenced by a variety of supply side policies but aqqreqate
demand policies may also play a role. The effort function will be
related to workers' waqe aspirations and if waqe aspirations
depend on past outcomes of the distributional struqqle then an
important element of hysteresis is introduced into the system.
Expansionary demand policies which increase employment will be
asaociated with unanticipated inflation. Real waqes will fall
below the neqotiated level and this may cause a qradual shift in
waqe aspirations and in the effort function.1
The existence of class conflict is central to all neo-Marxian
Theories of distribution. Workers strive to raise real waqes
while capitalists aim to maximise profits, and the outcome is
determined by the relative strength of the two classes. A
Keynesian perspective, however, raises important objections to
this neo-Marxian story. Barqaininq between workers and
capitalists may determine the nominal waqe rate and this
determination will, in qeneral, depend on the expected price
level. But expectations will not always be realized and for a
closed economy it may be illeqitimate to assume that real waqes
are determined in the labour market. If there is imperfect
competition and constant labour productivity then firms may apply
a constant mark-up and the real waqe rate becomes invariant with
respect to variations in nominal wages. And if there is atomistic
competition and diminishinq returns to labour then the real waqe
rate is inversely related to the level of output and aqqregate
effective demand will determine real waqes.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine these Keynesian
objections. Section 1 describes how the strenqth of workers vis-à-
vis capitalists may exert a direct influence on the neqotiated
real wage. Section 2 considers the implications of combininq a
neo-Marxian distribution theory with mark-up pricinq. The role of
effective demand in the neo-Marxian theory and the possibility of
usinq aqqreqate demand policies to influence the lonq term
behaviour of the economy are analysed in section 3. The final
section contains a few concludinq remarks.
Section 1. Real Waqes and Employment.
Distribution is an important area of conflict between workers and
capitalists but it is not the only one. Equally important is the
determination of the intensity of work. Having hired workers,
firms face the problem of ensurinq that work is actually beinq
done. Labour power, the potential for work, needs to be
transformed into labour and the firm may have only one realz
sanction aqainst a non-workinq worker: it can dismiss the worker,
the threat of dismissal being effective if the worker suffers a
non-neqlible "cost of job loss". This conflict over work
intensity may lead to a direct relation between the strenqth of
workers and the real waqe rate.
The endoqenous determination of the intensity of work - or work
effort - is at the heart of efficiency waqe models.~~ As an
illustration we may assume - following Bowles and Boyer ( 1988) -
that effort, e, is an increasinq function of the cost of job loss
(1) e - e(wc).
The cost of job loss, in turn, is related to the unemployment
rate (u), the waqes paid in other firms (wa), and the incomes of
unemployed workers (wu) and we may assume a simple linear form,
(2) wc - w - (1-u) wa - u . wu .
Finally, assume that output is qiven by a fixed coefficient
production function
(3) q - min (eL,K)
where L is the input of labour in hours and where the capital
stock K is predetermined in the short run.





and the first order condition becomes3
e(wc)
(5) e'(wc) - w
or
e(wc)
(6) w - e,(wc) .
In equilibrium all firms pay the same waqe, w- wa, and equation
(6) defines a relation between w, wu and u.21 For any given value
of wu, we thus get a relation linkinq unemployment and the real
waqe. The relation looks like a labour supply curve but it is
derived entirely from firms' cost minimisation. The relation
describes how firms vary their waqe offers as a function of the
average rate of unemployment. Low employment - a small reserve
army of labour - implies that workers are strong. The threat of
dismissal loses its force and the level of effort declines. By
raisinq real wages firms partly offset the erosion in discipline:
higher real waqes counteract the decline in the cost of job loss
and hence in effort.
This link between employment and distribution can be used to
examine the dynamic behaviour of the economy. A constant rate of
utilisation of capital and a fixed coefficient production
function imply that the rate of profit is proportional to the
share of profit and the share of profits in income is qiven by




- h(wu,u); h~ C O, h2 ~ O.
If accumulation depends on profits, the lonq run equilibrium rate
of unemployment can now be determined. With a constant rate of
capacity utilisation and fixed coefficients the qrowth of
employment is equal to the rate of accumulation, and the chanqe4
in the employment rate ( 1-u) can be written
(8) (1-u) - K - n - ~p(,r) - n - a(h(wu,u)) - n - ~(1-u);
y' ~ O
where n is the growth rate of the total work force and wu has
been suppressed ín the ~-function on the assumption that it is
kept constant.
Equation (8) describes a stable dynamic system:31 the rate of
employment will converge to its unique long run equilibrium
value. The Marxian system has apparently qenerated a unique
"natural rate of employment". But some workers are involuntarily
unemployed. In fact, unemployment is essential to the functioning
of the system: it is needed to provide firms with the means to
extort effort from workers. ~~
Section 2. Mark-up pricinq and Keynesian demand.
The previous section has focused on the labour market. It has
been assumed that the firm takes into account the effect of waqes
on effort but there has been no consideration of the demand
conditions facing the firm, and Keynesian aqqreqate demand
problems have been ignored. These deficiences need to be
remedied.
With respect to market conditions, I shall adopt a simple form of
imperfect competition and assume that the conjectured demand
curve has constant elasticity,
(9) Pi - PQB YiY , O C Q G 1, 0( Y C 1
where pi and Yi are the price and output of firm i, p denotes the
averaqe price level of rival firms, and B is a multiplicative
constant.5
This specification implies that a profit maximising firm applies
a fixed mark-up to marginal cost,
(10) Pi - m ~ ci
where m- 1~(1-Y) and ci represents the firm's marqinal cost. If
firms are identical all subscripts may be deleted and we get
(11) P - mc.
There are good reasons to expect that under imperfect
competition firms will wish to maintain a cushion of excess
capital capacity and the empirical evidence confirms this
expectation. Since we have disreqarded raw-materials and
intermediate inputs and adopted a fixed coefficient production
function, marqinal cost is therefore equal to unit waqe cost and
from equation (1) we qet
(12) c- p w~e - p w~e(wc)
where p is a price index for consumption qoods (assumed equal to
the averaqe price level) and w and wc denote the real waqe and
the real cost of job loss, respectively.
Firms minimise unit costs takinq into account the dependence
of effort on waqes, and the value of w~e(wc) is determined as in
section 1 by wu and u,
(13) wle(wc) - u(u,wu).
Substitutinq equation (13) into (12) and rearranqing , we qet
(14) P - V(u~wu) ~ c
Equations (11) and (14) define two relations between price and
marginal cost. The value of u is determined by the properties of
the effort function and m is derived from the conjectured
elasticity of demand. If u and wu are arbitrarily qiven there is
no necessary link between the values of ~ and m and, in qeneral,
the model will be overdetermined.6
Inflation may act as the accommodatinq variable and eliminate
this overdeterminency in the short term. Assume, for instance,
that at time t workers have full knowledqe about the values at
time t-E of the price index, the rate of unemployment and the
income of unemployed workers, but that they have no information
about movements in these variables for the period between t-E
and t, and that expectations are static. The cost minimisinq
waqe rate is then given by
(15) x
t - pt-E w (wllt-E ~ ut-E)
where W is the nominal wage rate.
The introduction of incomplete information has invalidated the
contemporaneous relation between costs and prices in equation
(14). Instead, we now qet
(16) ct - Pt-E u(ut-e' wu t-e)
or
(17)
pt-f - Ct ~(ut-E~ wll t-E)




The rate of inflation will thus be positive (neqative) if m~ N
(mCN).
The analysis can be auqmented in the standard way to allow for
non-static price expectations. Assume that workers expect prices
at time t to be some multiple of the observed price index at time
t-E,




ct - ~Pt-f N(ut-E~ wu t-E)
pt - ~~ ,
V pt-E
Incomplete information and laqs in the adjustment process may
thus allow inflation to remove the overdeterminacy resultinq from
an inequality between N and m in the short term. inflation plays
a similar role in Rowthorn (1977) and Marqlin (1984). It is
doubtful, however, whether inflation can remove the over-
determinacy in the long term. Price expectations will chanqe in
the liqht of past experience and if the expectations parameter ~
in equation (19) chanqes endoqenously, the scene is set for
acceleratinq inflation: a non-acceleratinq inflation rate
requires that N(u,wu) - m. For any qiven value of wu we thus get
a unique NAIRU, u' - u'(m,wu).
Is u' a feasible lonq run equilibrium solutionl The dynamic
behaviour of u will - as in section 1- depend on the rate of
accumiilation and the movements in capital utilization. If o
denotes the rate of utilization then
(22) (1-u) - K t a - n
and in a Keynesian framework K and o are determined by the savinq
and investment functions. At a lonq run equilibrium we have (1-u)
- o- O and the equilibrium conditions can be written
(23a) S - I
K K
(23b) K - n
A standard specification of the savinq and investment functions8
will include both capital utilisation and the profit share as
independent variables. The profit share, however, is fully
determined by the mark-up and in order to ensure a solution to
(23a)-(23b) one needs to introduce another free variable. There
are several possibilities. Marqlin (1984) assumes that
accumulation depends on the rate of inflation. Alternatively,
savinq and~or investment may depend on the rate of interest
(Ambrosi (1988)) or it may be arqued that fiscal and monetary
policies influence savinq and~or investment and that deviations
from the NAIRU will induce policy changes (Rowthorn (1977)).
For present purposes the choice of accommodatinq variable is of
no importance. The point is simply that an extra variable needs
to be introduced in order to ensure the existence of a lonq run
equilibrium but that once this has been done the rate of
unemployment at the equilibrium will be fully determined by the
mark-up and the effort function. We have included Keynesian
elements in the analysis but the lonq run outcome appears to be
completely independent of these Keynesian elements.s~
Section 3. Policy Implications.
If the equilibrium rate of unemployment is independent of the
Keynesian elements in the model then aqgreqate demand policies
would appear to be ineffectual in the lonq run. In order to be
successful in the lonq term, employment policies must influence
the desired mark-up and~or the shape and position of the effort
function.
An active anti-monopoly policy aímed at increasing competition
may reduce m, and reductions in unemployment benefits and social
security payments may reduce wu and shift the u-function
downwards. These shifts in m and ~ both raise the equilibrium
rate of employment. Arguably, interventionist price and incomes
policies could achieve similar effects and institutional reforms
may also be used to shift the effort function. Employee share9
ownership plans, for instance, have become increasinqly popular
in the US. The popularity may be partly explained by tax
advantaqes but even The Economist (May 20 1989, p. 14) applauds
this development arguinq that "turning their employees into
shareholders will make them work harder and smarter and so boost
the company's productivity and profits to the benefit of all its
stiareholders" .
Structural supply policies like these can undoubtedly be
important for the long term development of the economy but how
robust is the neqative conclusion of ineffective demand policies7
Is it plausible to assume that m and N(.,.) are invariant with
respect to the state of effective demand?
The mark-up is determined by the conjectured elasticity of
demand and, as arqued in Auerbach and Skott (1988), these
conjectures may well chanqe endoqenously as firms revise their
demand expectations in the liqht of experience: there is no
reason to suppose that unanticipated chanqes in actual demand
will be reflected exclusively in adjustments in the conjectured
value of the multiplicative constant B in equation (9) with Y
remaininq unchanqed. Since aqgreqate demand policies influence
the demand conditions facinq the representative firm they may
therefore also affect the mark-up factor. Arquably, however, the
effect of demand on the u-function will be of qreater interest.
Let us assume, therefore, that m is given and consider the
factors determining the shape and position of the effort
function.
The dependence of effort on waqes can be derived from a standard
utility maximisinq framework where each worker's utility is qiven
as a function of consumption, leisure and effort. In this case
there is no reason to expect any influence of aqqreqate demand on
the effort function.61 But other interpretations of the effort
function are possible. Rowthorn's (1977) specification of the
"negotiated wage share" as well as the post-Keynesian and neo-10
Marxian use of real waqe tarqets (e.g. Arestis (1986), Sawyer
(1986) are also consistent with the efficiency wage framework.
In Rowthorn's model the balance of power between workers and
capitalists in the labour market determines the negotiated waqe
share. Unanticipated price chanqes, however, may cause the actual
real waqe to deviate from the neqotiated waqe. Workers, in
Rowthorn's words, "may neqotiate increases desiqned to qive them
a certain standard of living, and individual capitalists, havinq
aqreed on these wage payments, may then set prices so as to
achieve a certain tarqet rate of profit. For any individual
capitalist, this need not imply a deliberate attempt to alter the
level of real waqes and vitiate what has been agreed in the wage
barqain. Yet aqqreqatinq over the whole economy this may be the
objective consequence of their individual and uncoordinated
decisions". (p. 150).
In this respect the argument in section 2 mirrors Rowthorn's
analysis. The efficiency waqe represents the neqotiated waqe and
the aqqreqated effects of mark-up pricinq leads to unanticipated
price chanqes and deviations from the efficiency waqe.
How is the neqotiated real wage to be determined in Rowthorn's
framework7 He arques that as labour "reserves are proqressively
exhausted or unemployment reduced, their bargaininq position
becomes stronqer and workers become more confident and
aqqressive" and "workers use their qreater power to extract
hiqher waqes from their employers" (p. 154).
But why should firms accept these waqe claims7 An obvious
explanation is that they may find it in their own best interest
to do so since rejection of the waqe claim may raise unit labour
costs even more: workers may threaten industrial action and a
failure to raise waqes may also increase unit costs in less
dramatic ways as workers' dissatisfaction affects work intensity
and labour turnover. The negotiated real waqe thus is closely
related to efficiency waqe. But Rowthorn (p. 174) explicitly11
rejects the standard framework of individual utility
maximization. Instead, orqanised power, politics and ideoloqy
play important roles.
A simplified interpretation of Rowthorn's arqument is outlined in
fiqure 1. Given their price expectations, workers demand money
waqe, WT. A waqe rate at or above WT leads to normal levels of
work intensity while waqe offers below WT cause industrial unrest
and low productivity. Firms minimise unit costs and with a
discontinuity at WT they accept the waqe demand. But how is WT to
be determined? The expected price level, the size of the reserve
army and the level of benefits may be important, but - rejecting
the individual utility approach - the historically and socially
conditioned wage aspirations also play a role. Alqebraically, WT
can then be written as:
(24) WT - Pe~(u,wu,x); wu t 0 ww ~ O ~x ~ 0
where x represents the historical and ideological element in wage
formation. To simplify, we may assume that real benefits wu - wu
are constant and, by assumption, we have W- WT and w- w
where w is the real waqe rate associated with the price mark-up m
and the normal productivity level é.
Figure 1 about here
The difference between equation (24) and the earlier
specifications in equations (14) and (15) is the appearance of
the historical element x in (24). The evolution of x will be
influenced by ideoloqical and political factors which are
exoqenous to any simple economic model but there may also be
important feedback effects from the economic variables. If, for
instance, actual waqes exceed the neqotiated waqe for a prolonged
period then it seems inconceivable that the neqotiated waqe
should remain fixed at the original level. Waqe aspirations will
be conditioned by past levels of the real waqes and one would12
expect x to change in response to discrepancies between the
neqotiated and the actual real waqe.71 We thus qet a relation of
the followinq form
(25) x- 9(wlwT): 4~ ~ 0, 4(1) - o
Substitutinq equation (24) into ( 25) and usinq ( w,wu) -(w,wu)
we qet the expression
(26) x- B(wl~(u,wu,x)) -~(u,x): ~u ) 0, yx C O
Equation (26) implies that waqe aspirations (worker militancy)
will adjust over time and that any qiven rate of unemployment can
become a lonq run equilibrium. If unemployment is maintained at u
- up - through the use, for instance, of active demand policies -
then x will converge to a value x(u0) such that
w-~(u0,wu,x(u~)). The policy conclusions have been reversed:
Keynesian policies can influence the lonq run equilibrium if one
allows for an historical element in the formation of waqe
demands.
What are the consequences for inflation of expansionary Keynesian
policies? Assume that initially the economy is in a position of
lonq run equilibrium at u- u~ but that the government wants to
move to a new long run position at u- u~, and hence a new
equilibrium value of x, x- x~, which solves f(u~, wu,x~) - w.
We have WtTlpt - w and WtTlpt - wtT (where pt is the expected
price as of time t-1) and equation (25) can therefore be
rewritten in terms of expected and actual prices,B1
(27) x - 4PelP - 9(Pe-P)
Adjustment to the new equilibrium at x~ implies
(28) x~ - xp - Ix - 19(Pe -P)13
and the inflationary implications of this chanqe in x and u
clearly depend upon the formation of price expectations as well
as on the precise specification of the q-function.
Consider first the simple case of static price expectations.
we then have pe - p and hence t t-1
(29) Pe - ~
The economy converges to a new equilibrium with x- O and since x
- q(pe-p) - q(-p) it follows that the rate of inflation will
converqe to zero. Expansionary policies thus do not affect the
lonq term inflation rate in this case. But if we modify the
expectational hypothesis the conclusion chanqes. Assume, for
instance, that expectations are static with respect to the rate
of inflation, i.e.
(30) Pt - Pt-1
and hence
(31) x - 4(Pe-P) - 4(-P)
The equilibrium condition x- O now implies p- 0. The rate of
inflation will be stationary at the new equilibrium but the new
equilibrium value p1 will (in qeneral) be different from the
initial inflation rate p0.
The value of p1 is fully determined and path-independent if
g is linear. We then have
a
(32) x1 - x0 - .Í4(-P) - .Í - eP
or
(33)14
The equilibrium values of x and u are directly related and
equation (33) therefore implies a Phillips relation between
the long run equilibrium values of inflation and unemployment.
This stable Phillips curve evaporates as soon as one
introduces non-linearities in the q-function. If, for instance, q
is cubic then
(34) x~ - x~ - j - a(P)3
and
(35) P~ - P~ - JP
It follows that the relation between p~ and x~ (and hence between
p~ and u~- u~(x~)) will be path-dependent. If the government
wants to minimise the inflationary consequences of the desired
reduction in u(and x), then the cubic specification in (34)
implies that it should apply a short sharp shock: a large
expansion of demand - taking the unemployment rate temporarily
below the desired lonq term value - will imply high values of
p and these affect militancy more stronglyrthan inflation.
.
If, for instance, ut is fixed such that pt - b during the
transition from x0 to x~ then the lenqth of the transitional
period is qiven by T-(x0-x~)~nb3 and the inflationary impact of
the policy is p~ - p~ - T-b -(x~-x~)~acb2.
The policy conclusions are reversed if q' is decreasinq as a
function of ~- pl rather than increasinq as in the cubic
example. If unanticipated inflation have a less than proportional
effect on militancy then the inflationary consequences are
minimised by adoptinq a slow and qradual policy. Althouqh the
introduction of a feedback effect from realised waqe rates to
future wage aspirations leaves room for Keynesian demand
policies, it is therefore not possible to derive precise policy
conclusions without detailed knowledge of the functional forms.15
Section 9.
The efficiency waqe approach can provide a formal explanation of
the direct influence of unemployment on the neqotiated real waqe
but price expectations will not be realized unless the neqotiated
real waqe happens to be compatible with firms' pricinq policies.
The explicit consideration of pricinq and product market
conditions in a neo-Marxian framework thus leads to the existence
of a unique NAIRU. The value of the NAIRII can be influenced by a
variety of supply side policies but in this paper I have arqued
that aqqreqate demand policies may also play a role. If waqe
aspirations depend on past outcomes of the distributional
struqqle then an important element of hysteresis is introduced
into the system. Expansionary demand policies which increase
employment will be associated with unanticipated inflation. Real
waqes will fall below the neqotiated level and this may cause a
qradual downward shift in the schedule of waqe demands.
The arqument in favour of induced shifts in waqe aspirations does
seem plausible but the siqnificance of these shifts depends
critically on the speed with which they occur and a priori
reasoning has little to say on this issue. it should be noted
also that there may be anti-Keynesian feedback effects from the
rate of employment on workers' militancy and waqe demands: low
unemployment may cause a qradual increase in militancy. This
effect is at the heart of Goodwin's (1967) formalisation of
Marx's theory and it has been used in numerous extensions of
Goodwin's analysis: This anti-Keynesian feedback may help to
explain the lonq term movements in unemployment, inflation and
industrial conflict over the postwar period (see Desai (1989) and
Skott (1990)) and it may well be of qreater empirical importance
than the hysterises effects analysed in this paper.16
Footnotes.
1. See Bowles (1985) and Green (1988) for a discussion of the
relationship between Marxian conceptions of production and
the efficiency waqe literature.
2. In the simple case when e-(wc)Y we qet
u w - . w . u-y u
3. The present specification of the rate of accumulation
represents a qeneralisation of Goodwin's (1967) analysis.
Unlike Goodwin, however, it is assumed that the rate of
unemployment determines the share of waqes in income (not the
chanae in the share of wages) and this accounts for the
qualitative difference in the dynamic behaviour of the two
systems.
4. An equilibrium u" e]0,1[ exists if W(0) ) 0 and W(1) ( O. If
the first inequality is violated then u' - 1. Violation of
the second inequality implies that the assumption of full
capacity utilisation must be abandoned: in this case the rate
of accumulation exceeds the qrowth rate of the labour force
even at full employment. Real waqes, however, qo to infinity as
u~ u~ ~ 0 and as qross profits become neqative, firms will
cease production and net accumulation will (on any reason-
able specification) become negative. Stronq theoretical
reasons thus support the second inequality.
5. Bowles and Boyer ( 1988) analyse a model which includes both
efficiency waqes and separate savinq and investment
functions. They do not, however, consider the pricinq
decisions (the market conditions of individual firms) and
allow the mark-up to vary freely. Shifts in the savinq and
investment functions therefore influence the equilibrium rate
of unemployment in their model.17
6. What matters, however, is firms' conjectured relationship
between waqes and effort and if firms have imperfect
information then these conjectures may be revised as a result
of shocks to the economy. An aggregate demand shock, for
instance, may lead to an increase in all waqe rates and
prices but firms and~or workers may not realize
instantaneously that relative real waqes are unchanged.
7. A similar argument is used in the Keynesian literature on
waqe relativities. Workers have views about what constitutes
a fair waqe structure and deviations from fairness cause wage
claims to escalate. Fairness, however, is hard to achieve
since, as arqued by Hicks (1974), "[n] system of wages, when
it is called into question, will ever be found to be fair"
(p. 65). In order to reduce conflict over relativities it
therefore becomes important that "the system of wages should
be well established, so that it has the sanction of custom.
It then becomes what is expected; and (admittedly on a low
level of fairness) what is expected is fair" (Hicks (1974, p.
65)). See also Wood (1978), Paldam (1989) and Skott (1990).
8. The second equality in (29) uses a first order approximation.
We have pt~pt - exp (log PtIPt-1 - log PtIPt-1)
~ exP [(Pt-Pt-1)~Pt-1 - (Pt-pt-1)IPt-1]
- exP (Pe- P )18
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